the visual coverage includes dramatic aerial footage and close-ups of the Front Altair and Kokuka Courageous after they suffered heavy hull damage and severe fires from the attacks. 2019

Possible futures based on historical Lessons

1. Introduction

1.1 The Question and the International Context

Iran is facing one of the most consequential periods in its modern history. Years of economic deterioration, international sanctions, widespread corruption, political repression, and declining public confidence have placed enormous pressure on the Islamic Republic. The violent suppression of public protests, particularly the January 2026 massacres, has further deepened the divide between the governing establishment and significant parts of Iranian society. Meanwhile, military confrontation involving Iran, the United States, and Israel has exposed the country’s military capabilities, infrastructure, economy, and political institutions to unprecedented pressure.

Yet the central question is not simply whether the Islamic Republic will survive. It is what happens to the people of Iran under the different possible outcomes.

The collapse or weakening of an authoritarian government does not necessarily bring freedom, stability, or prosperity. History offers examples of societies in which the removal of a government was followed by reconstruction, but also examples in which military defeat, institutional collapse, economic destruction, or prolonged conflict brought years of suffering. In some cases, governments survived devastating external attacks while their populations endured the consequences. In others, regimes fell, but the resulting political vacuum created new conflicts and humanitarian disasters.

This article examines Iran’s possible future through comparisons with several historical cases, including Nazi Germany, Maoist China, Iraq, Serbia, Venezuela, Syria, Libya, and the Soviet Union. These cases illustrate different mechanisms: infrastructure destruction, economic pressure, ideological mobilisation, domestic surveillance, repression, institutional resilience, regime collapse, and the challenges of establishing a functioning political order afterward.

The purpose is not to predict the future with certainty or to justify military intervention. It is to examine what history can tell us about the possible consequences of different trajectories, and ultimately what conditions might allow the Iranian people to build a peaceful, stable, and prosperous future.

1.2 How Iran Reached This Point

The Islamic Republic was established following the 1979 revolution, which overthrew the monarchy and brought a broad but politically diverse revolutionary movement to power. The new leadership rapidly moved to consolidate its authority, marginalise rival political groups, weaken independent institutions, and establish a political system centred on clerical rule and the authority of the Supreme Leader under the principle of absolute guardianship of the Islamic Jurist (Velayat-e motlagheye Faqih)

The consolidation of power followed several patterns familiar from other authoritarian movements such as Nazi germany: the elimination of political rivals, the creation of parallel security organisations, ideological mobilisation, and the gradual removal of meaningful political competition. These are comparisons of political mechanisms, not claims of ideological or historical equivalence. The Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988) accelerated this process. It strengthened the Revolutionary Guard and the Basij, provided a powerful justification for militarisation and internal security measures, and allowed the leadership to portray dissent as a threat to the country during wartime. Political executions and mass imprisonment, including the mass execution of political prisoners in 1988, became instruments of repression and intimidation.

Over the following decades, the Islamic Republic developed an extensive and overlapping security structure. The Revolutionary Guard, its intelligence organisation, the Ministry of Intelligence, the police, the Basij, and other institutions operate through different chains of command and areas of responsibility. Religious institutions and mosque-based networks have also played a role in local mobilisation, surveillance, and ideological control. Unlike earlier authoritarian systems, Iran has increasingly combined these networks with digital surveillance and modern information technologies.

However, the regime’s coercive structures have not prevented repeated waves of public resistance. Iranians have risen in protest on numerous occasions, including in 1999, 2009, 2017–2018, 2019, 2022, and 2026. These movements reflect a deep and longstanding legitimacy crisis. Survey research by GAMAAN has also documented very limited support for the continuation of the Islamic Republic in this form (only 9% as 27 July 2026). According to Gamman statistics, the legitimacy of the regime dropped by 6% after January 2026 massacres. In other words, the regime has a small minority supporter.

Opposition is also represented outside the country by figures such as Reza Pahlavi, the son of Iran’s last Shah, who has attracted substantial support among opponents of the Islamic Republic and has presented himself as a potential focal point for coordinating political change and a transition. GAMAAN surveys have also examined changes in support for him over time. Nevertheless, opposition to the Islamic Republic should not be confused with support for the restoration of the monarchy or for any single political figure. The extent of Pahlavi’s support across the population, and his ability to organise effective resistance and coordinate a transition inside Iran, remain important questions.

Nor has a unified opposition movement representing all of Iran’s political, ethnic, and regional interests yet emerged. Kurdish and Baluch political organisations and other minority movements have their own political demands and relationships with the opposition outside the country. Some armed opposition groups are concentrated in peripheral and border regions, particularly among Kurdish and Baluch movements, but organised armed resistance remains limited compared with the wider population. This is an important distinction from countries such as Iraq, where tribal networks and armed groups were more deeply embedded in society and already possessed significant weapons and local military capacity. The degree of political unity, mutual trust, and coordination among Iran’s opposition groups will therefore be an important factor in any transition.

The current confrontation also raises issues that go beyond the future of the Iranian government. One example is the Strait of Hormuz, through which a substantial share of the world’s internationally traded oil passes. Iran’s demand for greater control over the strait, including restrictions on shipping and potential transit charges, is not merely a bilateral disagreement with the United States. International maritime law recognises rights of passage through international straits. Neither Iran nor any other coastal state has an unrestricted right to impose unilateral control over international shipping or to make passage dependent on its political or economic demands. Taking hostage of world economy and the rights of other countries cannot simply be negotiated away in a deal between Washington and Tehran.

This distinction matters regardless of who occupies the White House. A US president may negotiate over sanctions, compensation, security arrangements, and other matters between the two countries. But accepting unilateral Iranian control over an international strait would have consequences extending far beyond the United States. It could be interpreted as a weakening of the international maritime order and of the United States’ willingness to protect freedom of navigation. It could also affect perceptions of American power and credibility among other states, including strategic competitors such as China and North Korea. At the same time, the conflict between Iran and Israel remains unresolved and has become more deeply entrenched. The question is therefore not simply whether Washington/ Israel and Tehran can reach a bilateral agreement, but whether is this dispute even solvable via negotiations. The author believes it is not. Thus For the purposes of examining the possible consequences for Iran’s population and infrastructure, this article considers a scenario involving further extensive aerial strikes.

The scale and targets of any such campaign cannot be known in advance, but the possibility of severe damage to essential infrastructure, including water and electricity systems, steel production, oil and gas facilities, must be taken seriously. The consequences would depend not only on the military targets selected but also on the duration of the campaign, the resilience of the infrastructure, and the availability of humanitarian assistance and reconstruction.

Throughout this article, it is essential to distinguish between the Iranian people, the Iranian state, and the Islamic Republic’s governing establishment. The rights and future of the people of Iran are not identical to the political interests or demands of the regime that rules them unfortunately.

An important distinction throughout the analysis will therefore be between the collapse of a regime and the collapse of a state. A government may lose power while the country’s administrative institutions, security structures, and public services remain functional. Alternatively, the removal or weakening of central authority may undermine those institutions, creating conditions for prolonged instability. This distinction is particularly important in Iran, where the Islamic Republic has deeply embedded itself in state institutions, the economy, the security apparatus, and the legal system. Some institutions are directly dependent on the authority of the Supreme Leader, while others may be difficult to separate from the regime because of overlapping responsibilities, political appointments, networks, and systemic corruption. The question of which institutions could continue functioning after a political collapse, and which would need to be reformed or replaced, is therefore central to the country’s future.

Ultimately, the question guiding this analysis is straightforward but profound: Regardless of what happens to the Islamic Republic, what are the likely consequences for the people of Iran, and what conditions would make a peaceful, stable, and prosperous future possible?

Historical Cases

six cases will be discussed:

2. Nazi Germany (1933–1945): Authoritarian Consolidation and Collapse

a. Background: From political takeover to military defeat

After Adolf Hitler was appointed Chancellor in January 1933, the Nazi Party rapidly dismantled Germany’s democratic institutions. Using emergency powers, political violence, arrests and propaganda, it eliminated rival parties, independent trade unions and organised opposition. Within months, Germany had become a one-party dictatorship. Over the following years, the regime extended its control through the Nazi Party, ideological organisations, the SS, the Gestapo and the wider police apparatus. The system relied not only on state repression but also on local party officials and denunciations by ordinary citizens. [1][2]

The regime collapsed only after Germany suffered complete military defeat. Allied bombing severely damaged cities, industry and transport, but it did not by itself overthrow Hitler. The decisive factor was the advance of Allied ground forces from the west and Soviet forces from the east, followed by the occupation of German territory. Hitler died by suicide on 30 April 1945, and Germany surrendered in May. The Nazi state was dismantled, leaving a devastated country facing displacement, shortages, occupation and the difficult task of political reconstruction. [3]

b. Similarities with the Islamic Republic

The consolidation of the Islamic Republic after 1979 followed several patterns that can also be observed in Nazi Germany. In both cases, a revolutionary political movement used its initial access to state power to eliminate competing political forces, weaken independent institutions, and establish a system in which loyalty to the ruling ideology became central to political and institutional life. The Iran–Iraq War accelerated this process in Iran, strengthening the Revolutionary Guard and the Basij and providing the leadership with a justification for intensified internal security measures.

Both systems also extended political control beyond conventional police and military structures. Nazi Germany relied on party organisations, local officials, the SS, the Gestapo and information provided by citizens. In Iran, the Basij, the Revolutionary Guard, intelligence organisations, police and mosque-based networks have played overlapping roles in ideological mobilisation and domestic control. The religious dimension adds a distinctive feature to the Iranian system: the leadership presents its political authority as rooted in divine legitimacy, potentially turning opposition into an act portrayed not merely as political disloyalty but as opposition to a religious order.

Both regimes used severe repression to intimidate opponents and discourage organised resistance. In Iran, this included mass executions of political prisoners in the early 1980s and the mass prison executions of 1988. The existence of several security and intelligence organisations, including the Ministry of Intelligence and the IRGC Intelligence Organisation, also creates multiple channels for monitoring and suppressing opposition.

The comparison concerns methods of authoritarian consolidation and social control, not an equivalence between the two regimes’ ideologies, historical circumstances or crimes.

c. Differences from the Islamic Republic

Public legitimacy and domestic resistance. Nazi Germany initially enjoyed substantial popular support, particularly during its early years and military successes. Iran’s Islamic Republic, by contrast, has faced decades of declining legitimacy, repeated nationwide protests and a deep divide between the governing establishment and significant parts of society. Iranian resistance has emerged repeatedly, including in 1999, 2009, 2017–2018, 2019, 2022 and 2026.

Iran also has a prominent opposition figure outside the country: Reza Pahlavi, the son of the last Shah. He has attracted substantial support among opponents of the Islamic Republic and has presented himself as a potential focal point for coordinating a political transition (45% positive evaluation in latest Gamman survey). His supporters see the possibility of mobilising civil resistance and helping coordinate an alternative political structure. However, the extent of his support across the entire population, his ability to organise resistance inside Iran, and the willingness of different opposition groups to accept his leadership remain uncertain. Nazi Germany had no comparable opposition figure or organised domestic alternative capable of taking over the state in its final years.

Technology and surveillance. Nazi Germany developed an extensive system of surveillance and informants for its time, but it lacked today’s digital networks, large-scale data processing, facial recognition and AI-assisted monitoring. Iran combines local ideological and security networks with modern digital surveillance and information technologies. These capabilities may increase the state’s ability to identify and suppress opposition, although technological sophistication does not guarantee loyalty, effective coordination or control during a national crisis.

External military intervention. This is one of the most important differences. Germany’s regime was ultimately destroyed through a combination of bombing, military defeat, a ground invasion and foreign occupation. Allied forces entered and occupied German territory, dismantled the Nazi state and assumed control of its institutions. An air campaign against Iran, even one causing extensive damage to military and civilian infrastructure, is fundamentally different from a ground invasion and occupation. Bombing alone does not necessarily remove a government or establish a new political order. Iran’s future could therefore depend much more heavily on the interaction between domestic resistance, the cohesion of its security forces, and the ability of an internal political alternative to emerge.

Food, heating and economic stability. Another important difference concerns the ability to maintain basic living conditions during a prolonged crisis. Nazi Germany managed, through rationing, strict price and wage controls, resource extraction from occupied territories and the exploitation of forced labour, to maintain a relatively organised food supply for much of its own population until the final stages of the war.

Iran faces a different and potentially more dangerous combination of pressures. The regime’s ability to provide food and heating is uncertain, particularly given the country’s severe inflation, currency depreciation, existing energy imbalances and damage to gas infrastructure. Iranian officials have warned of significant gas shortages ahead of winter, including possible restrictions affecting several provinces. At the same time, high food prices and declining purchasing power mean that even when food is physically available, many households may no longer be able to afford it. The risk is therefore not limited to shortages in shops: it also concerns whether ordinary people can afford basic necessities. Food scarcity and inadequate heating could become serious humanitarian and political issues if these pressures continue or worsen.

The central lesson: Nazi Germany demonstrates that a regime can retain considerable control even under extreme military and economic pressure when several conditions reinforce one another. Despite growing destruction, the regime maintained a relatively organised supply of food and basic necessities for much of its population until the final stages of the war. A significant part of the population continued to support Hitler or the Nazi system even after Germany’s defeat. Fear of Soviet occupation, ideological commitment, propaganda and the hope of a last-minute military victory also discouraged resistance. In these circumstances, a popular uprising capable of overthrowing the regime was extremely difficult to imagine.

Iran presents a different picture. The Islamic Republic faces deep and longstanding public hostility, repeated waves of mass resistance, severe economic hardship and growing uncertainty about its ability to provide basic necessities such as food, electricity and heating. Many Iranians appear to view any weakening of the regime as an opportunity to challenge it. At the same time, the authorities have repeatedly demonstrated their willingness to use extreme violence and have threatened further bloody crackdowns. This creates a volatile situation: widespread opposition and a desire for change exist alongside fear of repression and uncertainty about whether public resistance can become sufficiently coordinated to overcome the security apparatus.

There is also a fundamental difference in the military circumstances. Nazi Germany was ultimately defeated by invading ground forces and placed under foreign occupation. An aerial campaign against Iran, however extensive, is not equivalent to a ground invasion and occupation. It may weaken the regime and create openings for internal opposition, but it does not necessarily dismantle the institutions that sustain its power. A ground invasion and occupation would represent a radically different scenario, with its own enormous human, political and regional costs. Neither outcome can be treated as a straightforward route to a stable political transition.

The comparison therefore raises an even more complicated question: Can a deeply unpopular regime survive a devastating external air campaign when its population is already facing severe economic hardship and many people are prepared to challenge it—but its security forces remain capable of violent repression? And if the regime does collapse, can domestic opposition translate that moment into a functioning political transition without a foreign ground invasion and occupation? Nazi Germany shows that repression, residual public support and fear can sustain a regime until military defeat. Iran’s different combination of public opposition, economic vulnerability, external military pressure and uncertain domestic political organisation makes its possible outcomes much harder to predict.

Sources

Additional sources on food supply and the economy:

3. Iraq: Two Wars, Two Different Outcomes (1991 and 2003)

a) Iraq 1991: Infrastructure destruction without regime change

After Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, a US-led international coalition launched a military campaign in January 1991. The air campaign targeted military installations, command structures, transportation networks and critical infrastructure. Iraq’s electricity-generating capacity was severely damaged, disrupting water purification, sewage treatment, healthcare and food distribution. Hospitals struggled to function, clean drinking water became difficult to obtain, and the risk of infectious disease increased. The precise human cost remains difficult to establish. A 1992 study estimated around 46,900 excess deaths among children under five during January–August 1991, attributing the increase to the combined effects of war and sanctions. However, the methodology and reliability of the much larger mortality estimates from this period have subsequently been challenged. These figures should not be treated as established estimates of deaths caused by bombing alone. [1][2][3]

The coalition’s ground offensive in February 1991 was primarily intended to liberate Kuwait, not occupy Baghdad or remove Saddam Hussein. His regime survived. The defeat weakened the government’s authority and encouraged uprisings among Shia communities in the south and Kurdish communities in the north. Saddam’s forces brutally suppressed these revolts, causing extensive deaths and displacement.

The economic consequences extended far beyond the military campaign. Iraq’s economy had already been weakened by the Iran–Iraq War and falling oil prices. The destruction of infrastructure, combined with international sanctions and the suspension of oil exports, caused a dramatic economic contraction. Industrial activity collapsed, inflation and shortages became severe, and public-sector salaries lost much of their value. The Oil-for-Food programme, introduced in 1996, allowed limited oil exports to finance food, medicine and other essential imports. It eased some of the humanitarian pressure, but did not restore a functioning economy. By the late 1990s, much of the population depended on government food rations to meet basic needs. [4][5][6]

b) Iraq 2003: Regime removal and institutional breakdown

In March 2003, a US-led coalition invaded Iraq. Baghdad fell in April, and Saddam Hussein’s government collapsed. Unlike in 1991, the objective was regime change, and Iraq came under foreign occupation.

The economic situation was already extremely weak after more than a decade of sanctions. Following the invasion, international sanctions were lifted and oil exports could resume. The coalition and international agencies continued humanitarian assistance and the existing food-ration distribution system, helping prevent a breakdown in food supplies. However, this assistance did not prevent serious food insecurity: poor planning and delays in replenishing food stocks contributed to local shortages in early 2004. Meanwhile, looting, insecurity, damaged infrastructure and falling oil production severely disrupted economic activity. The IMF estimated that Iraq’s GDP in US-dollar terms declined by approximately 22% in 2003. [7][8][9]

The subsequent occupation also faced a major institutional challenge. The Coalition Provisional Authority introduced de-Ba’athification, removing senior members of Saddam’s ruling party from public institutions, and dissolved the Iraqi army. This contrasted with postwar Germany, where parts of the existing administrative machinery and civil service continued operating under Allied supervision. In Iraq, the decisions weakened administrative and security capacity and left large numbers of former officials and military personnel without positions or livelihoods.

Combined with inadequate postwar planning, looting, existing social divisions and armed resistance, these decisions contributed to a prolonged security crisis, insurgency and sectarian violence. External actors, including Iran, also gained influence through political groups and armed organisations. Shia militias became increasingly powerful, while the insurgency later developed into movements including al-Qaeda in Iraq and, eventually, ISIS. The consequences extended well beyond the initial occupation, with years of instability and violence. [10][11]

c) Similarities with the Islamic Republic

Iraq demonstrates how military action can affect a country’s population and institutions without necessarily producing the political outcome intended by those conducting it. The 1991 campaign severely damaged civilian infrastructure without removing Saddam Hussein. The 2003 invasion removed his government but created a different set of problems during occupation and reconstruction.

Iran also has a highly developed network of state institutions, security organisations and public services. Some are closely connected to the Islamic Republic, particularly the IRGC and its associated economic and administrative structures. A major conflict could damage infrastructure while leaving the regime in place, or a political collapse could create uncertainty over which institutions and personnel would continue functioning.

d) Differences from the Islamic Republic

Society, demographics and state formation. Modern Iraq emerged as a state under British mandate after the First World War. Its society includes significant Shia and Sunni Arab communities, Kurds and other ethnic and religious groups. Religion, tribal affiliations and networks have also remained influential in many parts of the country. These identities do not mean that Iraq lacks a national identity, but they have shaped political alliances, local authority and competition over state power. Iran has its own ethnic and regional diversity, but a different historical development and institutional structure. It also has a particularly strong historical and cultural identity, with roots extending back roughly 2,500 years. This long historical consciousness and shared cultural heritage have contributed to a sense of national continuity across periods of political upheaval. [12][13]

Political leadership and preparations for a transition. After Saddam’s removal, Iraq lacked a broadly accepted political figure or movement capable of bringing its different communities and interests together. Deep social divisions, competing political groups and external interference made it difficult to establish a common political direction.

Iran has a prominent opposition figure in Reza Pahlavi, who has sought to position himself as a focal point for political change and a possible transition. His initiatives include the National Cooperation Campaign (کارزار همکاری ملی), launched in June 2025 to establish a communication channel with members of the military, security forces, police and government institutions who might be willing to break with the Islamic Republic. Subsequent initiatives have sought to broaden this organisational effort. Pahlavi has announced substantial registration figures, but these claims have not been independently verified, and it remains unclear how many participants are actively organised or able to coordinate in practice. The existence of these initiatives is nevertheless relevant: unlike Iraq in 2003, there is an identifiable opposition figure and an ongoing attempt to establish connections both within state institutions and among the wider population. Whether this can develop into an effective transition structure, and whether it would be accepted by Iran’s diverse opposition groups, remains uncertain though.

Armed groups and civilian access to weapons. Another important difference concerns the distribution of weapons and the presence of armed organisations within society. In Iraq, tribal networks and armed groups already had access to weapons and played an important role in local power structures. Following the collapse of central authority in 2003, these existing networks could expand their influence and contribute to the fragmentation of security and political authority. Iran has a different starting point. Organised armed opposition groups are relatively small and largely concentrated in peripheral and border regions, while armed resistance among the wider population is limited. This may reduce the risk of the country immediately fragmenting into competing armed factions, as happened in parts of Iraq. However, it does not rule out armed conflict, particularly around western Kurdish provinces if the central security apparatus breaks down or regional armed groups become more active and powerful, possibly due to foreign help.

The scale and nature of the state. Iraq in 2003 experienced the removal of its ruling leadership alongside major disruption to its existing administrative and security structures. Iran has a larger population, a more extensive bureaucracy and a different institutional structure. The consequences of dismantling or reforming its security organisations would therefore be specific to Iran and cannot simply be inferred from Iraq. However, the extent to which the Islamic Republic has penetrated state institutions through its laws, appointments and networks, and the dependence of several key institutions on the Supreme Leader, raise serious questions about how these institutions could function if the regime fell. There have also been efforts and discussions concerning how personnel within these institutions might be identified and organised in the event of a collapse. The extent and effectiveness of such preparations are difficult to assess, particularly because security considerations limit what can be made public.

Humanitarian consequences. Iraq in 1991 shows that infrastructure destruction can have consequences far beyond the immediate military campaign. Damage to electricity can interrupt water treatment, sanitation, hospitals, refrigeration and food distribution. Iran’s dependence on electricity, gas, water systems and complex supply networks makes this relevant, particularly if damage is combined with existing economic hardship. This could become either a similarity or a difference, depending largely on the US military strategy, the infrastructure targeted, the extent of disruption to essential services and the arrangements made for humanitarian assistance and reconstruction.

The political outcome. In 1991, Saddam survived despite extensive destruction and popular uprisings. In 2003, he was removed, but the country faced years of instability. These cases demonstrate that neither military destruction nor regime removal automatically produces political change that improves the lives of ordinary people.

The central lesson: Iraq offers two important warnings for Iran. A military campaign can devastate the infrastructure on which civilian life depends without removing the ruling regime. Conversely, removing the regime through invasion does not guarantee a functioning successor state. Preserving administrative capacity, essential services and institutional continuity may be just as important as removing the existing leadership. The existence of a potential unifying opposition figure may matter, but it cannot replace the difficult work of building an inclusive political settlement and maintaining the institutions on which everyday life depends.

Sources

Covid-19: Herd Immunity Vs. Upcoming Vaccine: Time Is Ticking!

Covid-19: idealism vs Pragmatism

Four Reasons Abortion Should Be Legalized

Electric Vehicles, a Tailored Myth Towards a Dark Future

What Happens to the People of Iran?

The World Peace at Verge of Collapse