3. The Soviet Union (1985–1991): Economic Decline, Reform and Collapse from Within

3.1 Background: How the Soviet Union fell apart

By the 1980s, the Soviet Union was experiencing prolonged economic stagnation. Its centrally planned economy suffered from low productivity, technological inefficiency, chronic shortages and widespread corruption. Enormous resources were spent maintaining a vast military and competing with the United States, while the war in Afghanistan (1979–1989) added further financial and political costs. The collapse in oil prices in 1986 also reduced an important source of Soviet foreign currency. US military expansion under President Ronald Reagan and the wider Cold War competition added to the pressure. However, the Soviet collapse was primarily driven by domestic political and economic problems, not external pressure alone. [5]

When Mikhail Gorbachev became Soviet leader in 1985, he introduced some reforms. Instead, political liberalisation exposed the scale of economic failure, weakened Communist Party control and allowed public criticism and national independence movements to grow. Economic reforms also disrupted the existing system without establishing a functioning alternative, worsening shortages and uncertainty. [5][6]

The collapse was driven by several forces. Popular demonstrations, strikes and independence movements challenged Moscow’s authority, particularly in the Baltic republics. But the decisive political struggle increasingly took place within the ruling establishment. Boris Yeltsin, a former senior Communist official who had broken with the party, became a major challenger to Gorbachev. In June 1991, he was directly elected president of the Russian republic with around 57% of the vote, giving him an independent popular mandate and a competing centre of political power. [7]

The turning point came in August 1991, when Communist hardliners attempted a coup against Gorbachev to reverse the reforms. Yeltsin led resistance from the Russian parliament building, while thousands of citizens gathered to oppose the coup. Crucially, the military did not act as a unified force to restore the old order: some commanders and units refused to follow the coup leaders’ orders. The coup failed within three days, further discrediting the Communist Party and strengthening Yeltsin. Over the following months, the republics moved towards independence. In December 1991, Russia, Ukraine and Belarus agreed to establish the Commonwealth of Independent States, effectively bringing the Soviet Union to an end. Gorbachev resigned on 25 December. [4][5]

3.2 Similarities with the Islamic Republic

• Economic pressure and military overextension. The Soviet experience shows how economic inefficiency, corruption, military expenditure and costly foreign commitments can gradually weaken a governing system. Iran faces its own combination of sanctions, economic mismanagement, corruption and substantial regional military commitments, including support for terrorist groups across the Middle East.
• The role of external pressure. US military and economic pressure contributed to the difficulties facing the Soviet Union, but did not independently cause its collapse. Similarly, external pressure on Iran may intensify existing weaknesses without necessarily producing regime change. [5]
• Divisions within the leadership. The Soviet collapse accelerated when political divisions reached the highest levels and senior figures began challenging the central leadership. A comparable split within Iran’s political establishment or security apparatus could be highly consequential. Ali Khamenei’s death at the start of US Iran war, and the appointment of his son Mojtaba as Supreme Leader have created a new succession context. Whether the new leadership can consolidate its authority, particularly under the pressure of war and internal instability, remains an important question. [1]

3.3 Differences from the Islamic Republic

• The structure of the state and territorial dissolution. The Soviet Union was a federation of 15 republics, each with its own political institutions and leadership. Its collapse was therefore also the disintegration of a multinational state into separate countries. Iran is a unitary state with a different historical and institutional structure; a political collapse would not automatically produce the same process of territorial dissolution. [5]
• Reform from within versus opposition from outside. The Soviet transformation was initiated by Gorbachev from within the ruling system. Yeltsin was also a former Communist official who built his political power inside Russia’s institutions and was directly elected. Iran’s reformist movement, once a significant political force, has lost much of its appeal among people seeking fundamental change. In GAMAAN’s June 2026 survey, only 9.6% considered the gradual reform within the Islamic Republic desirable. This measures political orientation rather than trust in specific politicians. [2] Iran has a prominent opposition figure abroad in Reza Pahlavi, but no equivalent internal political leader with control of a major state institution and an independent electoral mandate.
• The use of lethal force. Soviet authorities did use deadly force against independence movements and demonstrators, including in Tbilisi in 1989, Baku in 1990 and Vilnius in 1991. However, during the August 1991 coup, the military was divided and key units refused to carry out the coup leaders’ orders. This bears some comparison with the final days of the Iranian monarchy in 1979, when the military declared neutrality and the system collapsed. The Islamic Republic has repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to use extreme violence against domestic protesters. Amnesty International documented the killing of thousands during the January 2026 crackdown, with security forces firing on protesters in the streets in front of millions form their windows. Such violence has also served as a warning intended to deter further resistance. However, whether security forces would remain equally cohesive and willing to use lethal force during a serious leadership split is an important unknown. [3][4][8]
• Popular mobilisation and political organisation. Public demonstrations and strikes contributed to the Soviet collapse, but there was no single nationwide opposition movement that overthrew the Communist Party and took control. The process depended heavily on reformers, republican leaders and divisions within the ruling elite. Iran’s repeated protest movements and the existence of an identifiable opposition figure abroad create a different political landscape, although a unified opposition and effective internal coordination have yet to be established.
• The aftermath. The collapse of the Soviet system did not guarantee democracy. Russia experienced severe economic disruption, corruption, concentration of wealth and political conflict during the 1990s. These conditions helped create the circumstances in which power became increasingly concentrated under Vladimir Putin. Former elites and institutional networks also played important roles in shaping the post-Soviet order. [9]

Central lesson

The Soviet Union demonstrates that an authoritarian system can collapse not because one opposition movement defeats it, but because economic weakness, reform from above, popular pressure and divisions within the ruling elite reinforce one another until the centre can no longer hold the state together.

For Iran, the most important question may be what happens inside the security apparatus if the leadership begins to lose control. Would the IRGC, Basij, military and police remain united? Would commanders continue following orders to shoot protesters if other parts of the state began defecting? Would ordinary personnel obey orders against their own communities? Could hesitation, neutrality or fragmentation within these institutions create space for political transition?

The Soviet experience also provides a warning about what can comes afterwards: removing an old political system does not automatically create democracy. Former elites, institutional networks and economic interests can survive the transition and shape a new authoritarian order. The challenge for Iran would therefore be not only to bring about political change, but to preserve essential state functions while establishing institutions capable of preventing another concentration of power.

References

1. Reuters (8 March 2026) — Iran names Khamenei’s son Mojtaba as new Supreme Leader.
2. GAMAAN (June 2026) — Iranians’ Attitudes Toward the 2026 Protests and 39-Day War. See question 17 on political orientation.
3. Amnesty International (2026) — What happened at the protests in Iran?. Includes verified footage, eyewitness accounts and discussion of the difficulty of establishing the exact death toll.
4. Brian D. Taylor, Cambridge University Press (2003) — Gorbachev, Perestroika, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union, 1985–1991.
5. Alex Pravda, Cambridge University Press (2010) — The Collapse of the Soviet Union, 1990–1991.
6. International Monetary Fund (1990) — Reforming the Soviet Economy.
7. The Washington Post (June 1991) — Contemporary reporting on Yeltsin’s direct election as president of the Russian republic; see also the Harvard Davis Center’s analysis of Gorbachev and Yeltsin.
8. Amnesty International (January 2026) — Iran: Massacre of protesters demands global diplomatic action.
9. Alec Nove, National Institute Economic Review (1991) — The Soviet Economic Crisis.

To be continued…